Recently, it has been shown that probabilistic entailment under coherence is weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. Moreover, probabilistic entailment under coherence is a generalization of default entailment in System P . In this paper, we continue this line of research by presenting probabilistic generalizations of more sophisticated notions of classical default entailment that lie between modeltheoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence. That is, the new formalisms properly generalize their counterparts in classical default reasoning, they are weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment, and they are stronger than probabilistic entailment under coherence. The new formalisms are useful especially for handling probabilistic inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events. They can also be applied for probabilistic belief revision. More generally, in the same spirit as a similar previous paper, this paper sheds light on exciting new formalisms for probabilistic reasoning beyond the well-known standard ones.
Introduction
In the recent decades, probabilistic reasoning has become an important research topic in artificial intelligence. In particular, extensive research has been carried out on probabilistic reasoning with interval restrictions for conditional probabilities, also called conditional constraints [40] .
One important approach for handling conditional constraints is model-theoretic probabilistic logic, which comes especially from philosophy and logic, and whose roots go back to Boole's book of 1854 "The Laws of Thought" [11] . There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that have been explored in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, ranging from constraints for unconditional and conditional events [16, 20, 2, 53, 19, 23, 33, 45, 39, 40, 42, 46] to rich languages that specify linear inequalities over events [22] . The main problems related to model-theoretic probabilistic logic are checking satisfiability, deciding logical consequence, and computing tight logically entailed intervals.
Another important approach to probabilistic reasoning with conditional constraints, which has been extensively explored in the area of statistics, is based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and suitable generalizations of it [8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 27, 28, 29, 50] , or on similar principles that have been adopted for lower and upper probabilities [49, 54] . Two important aspects of dealing with uncertainty in this framework are (i) checking the consistency of a probabilistic assessment, and (ii) the propagation of a given assessment to further uncertain quantities.
The literature contains several different proposals for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases and extensive work on its desired properties. The core of these properties are the rationality postulates of System P proposed by Kraus et al. [34] . It turned out that these rationality postulates constitute a sound and complete axiom system for several classical model-theoretic entailment relations under uncertainty measures on worlds. In detail, they characterize classical model-theoretic entailment under preferential structures [51, 34] , infinitesimal probabilities [1, 47] , possibility measures [17] , and world rankings [52, 31] . They also characterize an entailment relation based on conditional objects [18] . A survey of all these relationships is given in [6, 24] .
Mainly to solve problems with irrelevant information, the notion of rational closure as a more adventurous notion of entailment was introduced by Lehmann [36, 38] . It is equivalent to entailment in System Z by Pearl [48] , to the least specific possibility entailment by Benferhat et al. [5] , and to a conditional (modal) logic-based entailment by Lamarre [35] . Finally, mainly to solve problems with property inheritance from classes to exceptional subclasses, the maximum entropy approach to default entailment was proposed by Goldszmidt et al. [30] ; lexicographic entailment was introduced by Lehmann [37] and Benferhat et al. [4] ; conditional entailment was proposed by Geffner [25, 26] ; and an infinitesimal belief function approach was suggested by Benferhat et al. [7] .
In this paper, we define probabilistic generalizations of entailment in Pearl's System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment that lie between entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic and entailment in probabilistic logic under coherence. Roughly speaking, the main difference between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence is that the former realizes an inheritance of logical knowledge, while the latter does not. Intuitively, the new formalisms now add a strategy for resolving inconsistencies to model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and a restricted form of inheritance of logical knowledge to probabilistic logic under coherence. This is why the new notions of entailment are weaker than entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic and stronger than entailment in probabilistic logic under coherence.
Hence, the new formalisms are refinements of both modeltheoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence. They can be used in place of modeltheoretic probabilistic entailment, when we want to resolve probabilistic inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events. Here, the new formalisms are especially well-suited as they coincide with model-theoretic probabilistic entailment as long as we condition on non-zero events. Furthermore, the new formalisms can be used in place of probabilistic entailment under coherence, when we also want to have an inheritance of logical knowledge. Finally, another important application is probabilistic belief revision.
A companion paper [44] presents similar probabilistic generalizations of entailment in Pearl's System Z and of Lehmann's lexicographic entailment. These formalisms, however, are quite different from the ones in this paper. In detail, the new formalisms in [44] add an inheritance of probabilistic knowledge and a strategy for resolving inconsistencies to entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. For this reason, they are generally much stronger than entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. Thus, they are especially useful where the classical notion of modeltheoretic entailment is too weak, for example, in probabilistic logic programming [42, 41] . Other applications are deriving degrees of belief from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief, handling inconsistencies in probabilistic knowledge bases, and probabilistic belief revision.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We show that the notions of g-coherence and of gcoherent entailment in probabilistic logic under coherence can be expressed in terms of probability rankings.
• We present new probabilistic generalizations of entailment in Pearl's System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, which lie between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence.
• We analyze and compare some general nonmonotonic properties of the new notions of entailment, of modeltheoretic probabilistic entailment, and of probabilistic entailment under coherence. In particular, it turns out that the new formalisms satisfy the properties of Rational Monotonicity and Irrelevance, while probabilistic entailment under coherence is lacking these properties.
• We analyze the relationship between the new notion of entailment in System Z, the new notion of lexicographic entailment, model-theoretic probabilistic entailment, and probabilistic entailment under coherence.
• We show that the new notions of entailment in System Z and of lexicographic entailment are proper generalizations of their classical counterparts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some technical preliminaries. In Section 3, we show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence can be expressed in terms of probability rankings, and we introduce the new probabilistic notions of entailment in System Z and of lexicographic entailment. Section 4 concentrates on the properties of the new formalisms and of the standard ones. In Section 5, we summarize the main results and give an outlook on future research. Note that detailed proofs of all results are given in the extended paper [43] .
Preliminaries
In this section, we first define probabilistic knowledge bases. We then recall the notions of satisfiability and of logical entailment from model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment from probabilistic logic under coherence.
Probabilistic Knowledge Bases
We assume a set of basic events Φ = {p 1 , . . . , p n } with n ≥ 1. We use ⊥ and ⊤ to denote false and true, respectively. We define events by induction as follows. Every element of Φ ∪ {⊥, ⊤} is an event. If φ and ψ are events, then also ¬φ and (φ∧ψ). A logical constraint is an event of the form ψ ⇐ φ. A conditional event is an expression of the form ψ|φ with events ψ and φ. A conditional constraint is an expression of the form (ψ|φ)[l, u] with events ψ, φ, and real numbers l, u ∈ [0, 1]. We define probabilistic formulas by induction as follows. Every conditional constraint is a probabilistic formula. If F and G are probabilistic formulas, then also ¬F and (F ∧ G). We use (F ∨ G) and (F ⇐ G) to abbreviate ¬(¬F ∧ ¬G) and ¬(¬F ∧ G), respectively, where F and G are either two events or two probabilistic formulas. We adopt the usual conventions to eliminate parentheses.
A world I is a truth assignment to the basic events in Φ (that is, a mapping I : Φ → {true, false}), which is inductively extended to all events by I(⊥) = false, I(⊤) = true, I(¬φ) = true iff I(φ) = false, and I((φ ∧ ψ)) = true iff I(φ) = I(ψ) = true. We use I Φ to denote the set of all worlds for Φ. A world I satisfies an event φ, or I is a model of φ, denoted I |= φ, iff I(φ) = true. We extend worlds I to conditional events ψ|φ by I(ψ|φ) = true iff I |= ψ ∧ φ, I(ψ|φ) = false iff I |= ¬ψ ∧ φ, and I(ψ|φ) = indeterminate iff I |= ¬φ. A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability function on I Φ (that is, a mapping Pr : I Φ → [0, 1] such that all Pr (I) with I ∈ I Φ sum up to 1). The probability of an event φ in the probabilistic interpretation Pr , denoted Pr (φ), is the sum of all Pr (I) such that I ∈ I Φ and I |= φ. For events φ and ψ with Pr (φ) > 0, we write Pr (ψ|φ) to abbreviate Pr (ψ ∧ φ) / Pr (φ). The truth of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F in a probabilistic interpretation Pr , denoted Pr |= F , is defined as follows:
• Pr |= ¬F iff not Pr |= F .
• Pr |= (F ∧ G) iff Pr |= F and Pr |= G.
We say Pr satisfies F , or Pr is a model of F , iff Pr |= F . We say Pr satisfies a set of logical and conditional constraints F , or Pr is a model of F , denoted Pr |= F , iff Pr is a model of all F ∈ F.
A probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L, P ) consists of a finite set of logical constraints L and a finite set of conditional constraints P such that (i) l ≤ u for all (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ P , and (ii) ψ 1 |φ 1 = ψ 2 |φ 2 for any two dis-
Example 2.1 A sample probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L, P ) is given as follows:
Here, L represents the logical knowledge "all penguins are birds". Moreover, in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, P expresses the logical knowledge "all birds have legs" and "all birds fly", while in probabilistic logic under coherence and in the new nonmonotonic logics, P expresses the default logical knowledge "typically, birds have legs" and "typically, birds fly".
Another probabilistic knowledge base KB ′ = (L ′ , P ′ ) is given as follows:
In model-theoretic probabilistic logic, the additional conditional constraint (fly | penguin)[0, 0.05] represents the probabilistic knowledge "at most 5% of all penguins fly", while in probabilistic logic under coherence and in the new nonmonotonic logics, (fly | penguin)[0, 0.05] represents the default probabilistic knowledge "typically, penguins fly with a probability of at most 0.05". 2
Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
We now recall the model-theoretic notions of satisfiability and of logical entailment.
A set of logical and conditional constraints F is satisfiable iff a model of F exists. A probabilistic knowledge base
A conditional constraint C is a logical consequence of a set of logical and conditional constraints F , denoted F ||= C, iff every model of F is also a model of C. A conditional
is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr (ψ|φ) subject to all models Pr of F with Pr (φ) > 0. Note that we define l = 1 and u = 0,
Example 2.2
The probabilistic knowledge base KB of Example 2.1 has the following logical consequences:
In fact, all these conditional constraints are even tight logical consequences of KB .
The probabilistic knowledge base KB ′ = (L ′ , P ′ ) of Example 2.1 has the following tight logical consequences:
Here, the empty interval " [1, 0] " in the last two conditional constraints is due to the fact that the logical property of being able to fly is inherited from birds to penguins and is incompatible there with the knowledge that at most 5% of all penguins are able to fly. Hence, in this example, the notion of logical entailment is too strong, as the desirable tight conclusions from KB ′ are given by (fly | penguin)[0, 0.05] and (have legs | penguin) [1, 1] , respectively. 2
Probabilistic Logic under Coherence
We now recall the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment. We define them by using some recent characterizations through concepts from default reasoning [10] . We first give some preparative definitions. [l, u] . A set of conditional constraints P tolerates a conditional constraint C under a set of logical constraints L iff L ∪ P has a model that verifies C. A set of conditional constraints P is under L in conflict with C iff no model of L ∪ P verifies C.
A probabilistic interpretation
A conditional constraint ranking σ on a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L, P ) maps each element of P to a nonnegative integer. It is admissible with KB iff every P ′ ⊆ P that is under L in conflict with some C ∈ P contains a conditional constraint C ′ such that σ(C ′ ) < σ(C).
We are now ready to define the concept of g-coherence.
A probabilistic knowledge base KB is g-coherent iff there exists a conditional constraint ranking on KB that is admissible with KB .
We next define the notion of g-coherent entailment. Let KB = (L, P ) be a g-coherent probabilistic knowledge base, and let (ψ|φ)[l, u] be a conditional constraint.
, iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of p subject to all g-coherent probabilistic knowledge bases (L, P ∪ {(ψ|φ)[p, p]}).
Example 2.3
The probabilistic knowledge base KB of Example 2.1 has the following tight g-coherent consequences:
Here, the interval "[0, 1]" in the last two conditional constraints is due to the fact that the logical properties of being able to fly and of having legs are not inherited from birds to penguins. Thus, in this example, the notion of g-coherent entailment is too weak, as the desirable tight conclusions from KB are given by (fly | penguin) [ Here, the last interval "[0, 1]" is due to the fact that the logical property of having legs is not inherited from birds to penguins. Thus, also in this example, g-coherent entailment is too weak, as the desirable tight conclusion from KB ′ is given by (have legs | penguin) [1, 1] . 2
Nonmonotonic Probabilistic Logics
In this section, we first show that the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment can be expressed in terms of probability rankings. We then introduce new probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z and of Lehmann's lexicographic entailment. Observe that the notion of g-coherent entailment is defined through a set of probability rankings, while the new notions of entailment in System Z and of lexicographic entailment are each defined through a unique single probability ranking.
In some sense, the new formalisms are second-order formalisms, as probability rankings are closely related to possibility measures over probabilities and can thus be seen as uncertainty measures over other uncertainty measures.
Probability Rankings
We now show that g-coherence and g-coherent entailment can be defined in terms of admissible probability rankings. We first give some preparative definitions.
In the sequel, we use α > 0 to abbreviate the probabilistic formula ¬(α|⊤)[0, 0]. A probability ranking κ maps each probabilistic interpretation on I Φ to a member of {0, 1, . . . } ∪ {∞} such that κ(Pr ) = 0 for at least one interpretation Pr . It is extended to all logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F as follows. If F is satisfiable, then κ(F ) = min {κ(Pr ) | Pr |= F }; otherwise, κ(F ) = ∞. A probability ranking κ is admissible with a probabilis-
The following result shows that g-coherence is equivalent to the existence of an admissible probability ranking.
Theorem 3.1 Let KB = (L, P ) be a probabilistic knowledge base. Then, KB is g-coherent iff there exists a probability ranking κ that is admissible with KB .
The next theorem shows that g-coherent entailment can be expressed in terms of admissible probability rankings.
Theorem 3.2 Let KB = (L, P ) be a g-coherent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
for every probability ranking κ that is admissible with KB .
System Z
We now extend Pearl's entailment in System Z [48, 32] to g-coherent probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L, P ). The new notion of entailment in System Z is linked to an ordered partition of P , a conditional constraint ranking z on KB , and a probability ranking κ z .
The z-partition of KB is the unique ordered partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of P such that each P i , i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, is the set of all C ∈ P −(P 0 ∪· · ·∪P i−1 ) that is tolerated under L by P − (P 0 ∪ · · · ∪ P i−1 ).
Example 3.3
The z-partition of the probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L, P ) in Example 2.1 is given by:
The z-partition of the probabilistic knowledge base KB ′ = (L ′ , P ′ ) in Example 2.1 is given as follows:
We next define the conditional constraint ranking z and the probability ranking κ z . For every j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, each C ∈ P j is assigned the value j under z. The probability ranking κ z on all probabilistic interpretations Pr is then defined as follows:
The following lemma shows that, in fact, z is a conditional constraint ranking on KB that is admissible with KB , and κ z is a probability ranking that is admissible with KB .
Lemma 3.4 Let KB be a g-coherent probabilistic knowledge base. Then, (a) z is admissible with KB . (b) κ z is admissible with KB .
We next define a preference relation on probabilistic interpretations as follows. For probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr ′ , we say Pr is z-preferable to Pr
A model Pr of a set of logical and conditional constraints F is a z-minimal model of F iff no model of F is z-preferable to Pr .
We finally define the notion of z-entailment as follows. A conditional constraint C is a z-consequence of KB , denoted KB ∼ z C, iff every z-minimal model of L satis-
, iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr (ψ|φ) subject to all z-minimal models Pr of L with Pr (φ) > 0.
The following example shows that z-entailment realizes an inheritance of logical properties from classes to nonexceptional subclasses. However, logical properties are not inherited from classes to subclasses that are exceptional with respect to some other property (in classical default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases, we call this undesirable feature inheritance blocking). Here, the last interval "[0, 1]" is due to the fact that the logical property of having legs is not inherited from birds to its exceptional subclass penguins. 2
The following lemma describes an alternative way of defining the notion of z-consequence.
Lemma 3.6 Let KB be a g-coherent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
C = (ψ|φ)[l, u] be a conditional con- straint. Then, KB ∼ z C iff κ z (φ > 0) = ∞ or κ z (φ > 0 ∧ C) < κ z (φ > 0 ∧ ¬C).
Lexicographic Entailment
We next extend Lehmann's lexicographic entailment [37] to g-coherent probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L, P ).
Note that even though we do not use probability rankings here, the new notion of entailment can be easily expressed by a unique single probability ranking.
We use the z-partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of KB to define a lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic interpretations as follows. For probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr ′ , we say Pr is lexicographically preferable (or lex-preferable) to Pr ′ iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k} exists such that |{C∈P i | Pr |= C}| > |{C∈P i | Pr ′ |= C}| and |{C∈P j | Pr |= C}| = |{C∈P j | Pr ′ |= C}| for all i<j≤k. A model Pr of a set of logical and conditional constraints F is a lexicographically minimal model (or lex-minimal model) of F iff no model of F is lex-preferable to Pr .
iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr (ψ|φ) subject to all lex-minimal models Pr of L with Pr (φ) > 0.
The following example shows that lex-entailment realizes a correct inheritance of logical properties. In particular, it does not show the problem of inheritance blocking. 
Properties
In this section, we analyze some properties of logical entailment, g-coherent entailment, z-entailment, and lexentailment. We first describe some general nonmonotonic properties. We then explore the relationship between the formalisms, and the one to their classical counterparts.
General Nonmonotonic Properties
We now analyze some general nonmonotonic properties of the probabilistic formalisms of this paper. It is important to point out that these properties are especially related to the inheritance of logical knowledge. [34] , which are commonly regarded as being particularly desirable for any reasonable notion of nonmonotonic entailment. The following result shows that logical entailment, g-coherent entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment all satisfy (probabilistic versions of) these postulates. 
Ref. KB ∼ (ε|ε) [1, 1] .
Or. If KB ∼ (φ|ε) [1, 1] and KB ∼ (φ|ε
Another desirable property is Rational Monotonicity (RM) [34] , which describes a restricted form of monotony, and allows to ignore certain kinds of irrelevant knowledge. The next theorem shows that logical entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment satisfy RM. Here, we use KB ∼ C to denote that it is not the case that KB ∼ C. 
The following example shows that g-coherent entailment, however, generally does not satisfy RM.
Example 4.3 Consider the probabilistic knowledge base
Then, (fly | bird) [1, 1] is a logical consequence (resp., gcoherent consequence, z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB . Moreover, (¬eagle | bird) [1, 1] is not a logical consequence (resp., g-coherent consequence, z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB .
Observe now that (fly | bird ∧ eagle)[1, 1] is a logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB , but (fly | bird ∧ eagle) [1, 1] is not a g-coherent consequence of KB . We remark that (fly | bird ∧ eagle) [1, 1] is the tight logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB , while (fly | bird ∧ eagle)[0, 1] is the tight g-coherent consequence of KB . 2
We now consider the property Irrelevance (Irr) adapted from [7] . Informally, Irr says that ε ′ is irrelevant to a conclusion "P ∼ (ψ|ε) [1, 1] " when they are defined over disjoint sets of atoms. The following result shows that logical entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment satisfy Irr.
Theorem 4.4 ||=, ∼
z , and ∼ lex satisfy the following property for all probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L, P ) and all events ε, ε ′ , and ψ:
Irr. If KB ∼ (ψ|ε) [1, 1] , and no atom of KB and
The following example shows that g-coherent entailment, however, does not satisfy Irr. Clearly, (fly | bird) [1, 1] is a logical consequence (resp., gcoherent consequence, z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB . Observe now that (fly | red ∧ bird) [1, 1] is a logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence)
is not a g-coherent consequence of KB . We remark that (fly | red ∧ bird) [1, 1] is the tight logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lexconsequence) of KB , while (fly | red ∧ bird)[0, 1] is the tight g-coherent consequence of KB . 2
We finally consider the property Direct Inference (DI) adapted from [3] . Informally, DI expresses that P should entail all its own conditional constraints. The following theorem shows that logical entailment, g-coherent entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment all satisfy DI. 
Relationship between Probabilistic Formalisms
We now explore the logical implications between the probabilistic formalisms of this paper.
The following theorem shows that the logical implications illustrated in Fig. 1 hold between logical entailment, gcoherent entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment.
Theorem 4.7
Let KB = (L, P ) be a g-coherent probabilistic knowledge base, and let C = (ψ|φ)[l, u] be a conditional constraint. Then,
(c) KB ∼ lex C implies KB ||= C.
In general, none of the converse implications holds, as Examples 2.2, 2.3, 3.5, and 3.7 immediately show. But in the special case when L ∪ P has a model in which the conditioning event φ has a positive probability, the notions of logical entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment of (ψ|φ) [l, u] from KB all coincide. This important result is expressed by the following theorem. 
The following example shows that g-coherent entailment, however, generally does not coincide with logical entailment when L ∪ P has a model Pr with Pr (φ) > 0. It is now easy to verify that (fly | eagle) [1, 1] is a logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB , but (fly | eagle) [1, 1] is not a g-coherent consequence of KB . We remark that (fly | eagle) [1, 1] is the tight logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB , while (fly | eagle)[0, 1] is the tight g-coherent consequence of KB . 2
Relationship to Classical Formalisms

